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The Role and Consequences of Strikes
by Public Employees*
John F. Burton, Jr.t and Charles Kridertt
Reason is the life of the law.
Sir Edward Coke
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
Oliver Wendell Holmes
The vexing problem of strikes by public employees has generated a
number of assertions based largely on logical analysis. One common
theme is that strikes fulfill a useful function in the private sector, but
are inappropriate in the public sector, because they distort the po-
litical decision-making process. Another is that strikes in nonessential
government services should not be permitted because it is administra-
tively infeasible to distinguish among the various government services
on the basis of their essentiality. The present article attempts to eval-
uate these assertions in terms of labor relations experience at the local
level of government.
The assertions concerning strikes by public employees which we shall
discuss have been drawn mainly from The Taylor Report, a report on
public employee labor relations submitted to the Governor of New
York State,1 and "The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Em-
ployment," a recent article by Harry Wellington and Ralph Winter.2
Most of the evidence used to evaluate these assertions has been gathered
in connection with the Brookings Institution Study of Unionism and
* This paper was prepared as part of a STUDY OF UNIONISMr AND COLGnva BAROAINING
IN THE PUBLIC SEcTOR which is being conducted by the Brookings Institution with financial
support from the Ford Foundation. The views are the authors' and are not presented as
those of the officers, trustees, or staff members of the Brookings Institution or of the Ford
Foundation.
Helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper were received from Paul F. Gerhart,
Robert B. McKersie, Arnold R. Weber, and Harry H. Wellington.
t Associate Professor of Industrial Relations and Public Policy, Graduate School of
Business, University of Chicago.
$ Graduate student, University of Chicago; and Research Assistant, Brookings In.
stitution.
1. GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC EMPLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL RMI'OpT (State of
New York, 1966) [hereinafter cited as TAYLOR CoasasTmE REORT]. The committee chair-
man was George W. Taylor.
2. Wellington and Winter, The Limits of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment,
78 YAix L.J. 1107 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Wellington and Winter].
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Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector.3 Statistical information on
all local public employee strikes which have occurred between 1965
and 1968 has been provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.4 Because
education is outside the scope of our portion of the Brookings study,
the data used in this article primarily relate to strikes by groups other
than teachers.
I. The Role of Strikes in the Private Sector
Wellington and Winter have catalogued four claims which are made
to justify collective bargaining in the private sector. First, collective
bargaining is a way to achieve industrial peace. Second, it is a way of
achieving industrial democracy. Third, unions that bargain collectively
with employers also represent workers in the political arena. Fourth,
and in their view the most important reason, collective bargaining
compensates for the unequal bargaining power which is believed
to result from individual bargaining. Wellington and Winter rec-
ognize that the gains to employees from collective bargaining, such
as protection from monopsony power, are to be balanced against the
social costs resulting from the resort to collectivism, such as distortion
of the wage structure. While noting that considerable disagreement
exists among economists concerning the extent of the benefits and costs,
they stress the fact that costs are limited by economic constraints.
Unions can displace their members from jobs by ignoring the discipline
of the market. These four justifications for private sector collective
bargaining are presumably relevant to some degree whether or not
strikes are permitted. Nonetheless, one can conceptualize two models of
collective bargaining-the Strike Model, which would normally treat
strikes as legal, and the No-Strike Model, which would make all strikes
illegal-and evaluate whether, in terms of the above justifications,
society benefits from permitting strikes.
Most scholars of industrial relations accept the view that the right to
strike is desirable in the private sector. Chamberlain and Kuhn assert,
"[T]he possibility or ultimate threat of strikes is a necessary condition
for collective" bargaining." The distinguished scholars who comprised
3. Some fifty cities, counties, and special districts were visited during 1968-69, and
numerous interviews were conducted. Specific references to these interviews are not in-
cluded because of our guaranty of anonymity to those we interviewed.
4. We would like to express our appreciation to the Bureau of Labor Statistics for
making this unpublished data available to us.
5. Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1112-13.
6. N. CHAmBERsat and J. Kuu, CoLacTnvz BAROAmmr 391 (2d ed. 1965).
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the Taylor Committee asserted similarly, "[T]he right to strike remains
an integral part of the collective bargaining process in the private enter-
prise sector and this will unquestionably continue to be the case."7 One
reason for this endorsement of the strike is that its availability is often
essential to the union in its bid for recognition by the employer.8 In
addition, once the bargaining relationship is established, the possibility
that work may be interrupted forces the parties to bargain seriously.0
The possibility of a strike thus increases the likelihood that the parties
will reach an agreement without third-party intervention. More im-
portant, the ability to strike increases the bargaining power of em-
ployees and their union so that, unlike the No-Strike Model, the
employer cannot dominate the employer-employee relationship.
Use of the Strike Model instead of the No-Strike Model appears to
enhance all but the third of the four claims for private sector collective
bargaining offered by Wellington and Winter. 0 While they do not
provide a claim by claim analysis of the consequences of permitting
strikes, their endorsement of strikes in the private sector must indicate
that they believe the Strike Model preferable to the No-Strike Model.
II. The Role of Strikes in the Public Sector
What are the virtues of collective bargaining in the public sector,
and what are the consequences of permitting strikes by public em-
ployees?
The advocates of one view presumably assume that the four reasons
offered by Wellington and Winter to justify collective bargaining in
the private sector have equal relevance in the public sector. They also
7. TAYLoA CothMirrEE Rr0ror, supra note 1, at 15.
8. Private sector unions subject to the Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley
Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-97 (1947), have little need for recognition strikes because the right of
self-organization is protected by statute.
9. "Since a strike hurts management by stopping production and workers by cutting
off their wages, neither patty is apt to reject terms proposed by the other without serious
consideration .... Without such a threat they may continue to disagree indefinitely atd
never bargain seriously, each simply refusing to give ground in an effort to reach a settle-
ment acceptable to both." CHAMBSFLAIN AND KuHN, supra note 6, at 391.
10. The first reason offered-it is a way to achieve industrial peace-appears to bo
inconsistent with the notion of permitting strikes as a method of lncreasing the employees'
bargaining power. One possible resolution of this apparent contradiction is that the
enhanced bargaining power of the employees will enable them to work out mutually satis-
factory terms with their employer without having to resort to the strike, while workers
with limited bargaining power will often engage in strikes as an expression of their futility,This explanation is not totally gomp~lling, how.ever, and one may therefore have to justify
colective bargaining among parties with equal power on grounds other than the dinlnu-lion of strikes. The favorable consequences of the lsit tree claims oftered by Wellington
and Winter for private sector colective bargaining presumably ofset any possible increase
in strikes.
420
Vol. 79: 418, 1970
The Role and Consequences of Strikes
assert that strikes play the same role in the public and private sectors,
and that our private sector strike policy should be replicated in the
public sector. Strikes would not be banned ab initio in any function,
but could be dealt with ex post facto by injunction if an emergency
occurred.
This approach has been argued by Theodore W. Kheel, a noted labor
arbitrator. He asserts that it is now "evident that collective bargaining
is the best way of composing differences between workers and their
employers in a democratic society . . ." The only alternatives to collec-
tive bargaining are two: "either the employer makes the final determi-
nation or it is made by a third party, an arbitrator." While collective
bargaining is the superior type of industrial relations, "collective bar-
gaining cannot exist if employees may not withdraw their services or
employers discontinue them."
[However, this does not mean] that the right to strike is sacro-
sanct. On the contrary, it is a right like all other rights that must
be weighed against the larger public interest, and it must be
subordinated where necessary to the superior right of the public
to protection against injury to health or safety ....
These principles, in my judgment, apply to the private sector as
well as to the public sector. Moreover, their application cannot be
determined in advance."'
Instead, Kheel believes, a procedure should be developed which would
halt a strike only after it could be demonstrated that the public health
and safety were endangered.
Proponents of the opposing view of public sector strikes argue that
such strikes are invariably inappropriate. The Taylor Committee con-
cluded that in the public services, "the strike cannot be a part of the
negotiating process."' And Wellington and Winter clearly believe that
overall the four claims for collective bargaining are valid in the public
sector only if strikes are illegal. Their primary concern is the fourth
reason offered for collective bargaining-collective activity is needed as
a substitute for individual activity because individuals are weak.13 This
reason is always troublesome because increased bargaining power in-
11. All quotations are from Kheel, Resolving Deadlocks Without Banning Strikes, 92
MoNTILY LAB. Rv. 62-63 (July 1969).
12. TAYLOR CoMwMmE REPORT, supra note 1, at 16.
13. "In the area of public employment the claims upon public policy made by the
need for industrial peace, industrial democracy and effective political representation point
toward collective bargaining." Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1115. "Much less
clearly analogous to the private model, however, is the unequal bargaining power argu.
ment." Id. at 1116.
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volves costs as well as benefits. They do not endorse the Strike Model
in the public sector because the costs which result from increasing
employee bargaining power by permitting strikes are higher and the
benefits are less in the public sector than in the private sector.
The benefits of collective action are less in the public sector for
several reasons. The problem of employer monopsony is not as conse-
quential, not only because employer monopsony is less likely to occur,
but also because existing monopsony power is less likely to be utilized.
In addition, the low pay given to certain groups in the public sector,
such as teachers, may reflect society's view about the best uses of its re-
sources, while low pay in the private sector for a particular occupation
presumably reflects a misallocation of resources.
The costs of substituting collective for individual bargaining are also
likely to be higher in the public sector. According to Wellington
and Winter, the market restraints on trade union activity are weak,
reflecting the inelastic demand for public services, a lack of substitutes
for these services, and the fact that many public services are essential.
Second, strikes in the public sector lead to public pressure on officials
which compels quick settlements. Further, there are no other pressure
groups competing for public resources which have weapons comparable
to the strike, and, thus, unions have a more advantageous arsenal of
weapons. The net result of the lack of market restraints, the pressure
on public officials to settle strikes quickly, and the absence of com-
parable weaponry by other pressure groups is that strikes in the public
sector impose high costs by distorting the normal political process.
Because the cost-benefit ratio which results from the substitution of
collective action, including strikes, for individual action is so high in
the public sector, Wellington and Winter argue that public employee
strikes should be illegal. Their argument is based on their notion of
sovereignty. This is not the traditional doctrine of sovereignty, which
they specifically reject,14 but a new version of sovereignty which asserts
that the government has the right, through its laws, "to ensure the
survival of the 'normal' American political process."" This rationale
for sovereignty, fully articulated in Wellington and Winter and implicit
in the Taylor Report analysis, deserves a careful scrutiny in terms of
empirical evidence.
14. See id. at 1125-26.
15. Id.
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III. Consequences of Strikes in the Public Sector
The best procedure for evaluating public sector strikes would be to
investigate the respective impacts of the Strike Model and the No-
Strike Model on each of the claims made for collective bargaining. Such
an analysis should consider the economic, political, and social effects
produced. An inquiry into these effects is particularly important since
several authors who have implicity endorsed the Strike Model in the
private sector have done so more on the basis of noneconomic reasons
than economic reasons.16 Nonetheless, the attack on the Strike Model in
the public sector has been based largely on the evaluation of the
fourth claim for collective bargaining, that relating to unequal bargain-
ing power. We will attempt to meet this attack by confining our discus-
sion to the economic consequences of collective bargaining with and
without strikes.
Even an examination confined to economic consequences is difficult.
The most desirable economic data, which would measure the impact
of unions on wages and other benefits, is unavailable. A major
examination of the relative wage impact of public sector unions is
now being conducted by Paul Hartman 7 but pending the outcome of
his study we have to base our evaluation on less direct evidence. Our
approach will be to review carefully the various steps in the analytical
model developed by Wellington and Winter by which they arrive at the
notion of sovereignty. If we find that the evidence available on public
sector strikes contradicts this model, we shall conclude that the differ-
ential assessment they provide for public and private strikes is unwar-
ranted.
A. Benefits of Collective Bargaining
Wellington and Winter believe the benefits of collective action, in-
cluding strikes, are less in the public sector than in the private sector
since (1) the problem of employer monopsony is less serious, and (2)
any use of monopsony power in the public sector which results in
certain groups, such as teachers, receiving low pay may reflect, not a
misallocation of resources, but rather a political determination of the
desired use of resources.
16. A. REFS, Tha EcoNoMICS OF TRADE UNIONS 194-97 (1962).
17. Paul Hartman of the University of Illinois is examining the impact of public Sector
unions on wages as part of the Brookings Institution's STDY OF UNIoNISM AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING IN THE PULC SECToR.
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Wellington and Winter assert that employer monopsony is less likely
to exist or be used in the public than in the private sector."8 But as they
concede,19 referring to Bunting, monopsony is not widespread in the
private sector and, except in a few instances, cannot be used as a
rationale for trade unions. They provide no evidence that monopsony
is less prevalent in the public than in the private sector. Moreover,
other labor market inefficiencies, common to the public and private
sectors, are probably more important than monopsony in providing an
economic justification for unions. For example, the deficiencies of
labor market information are to some extent overcome by union
activities, 20 and there is no reason to assume that this benefit differs
between the public and private sectors.
Assuming there is monopsony power, Wellington and Winter believe
that collective bargaining in the private sector can eliminate unfair
wages "which are less than they would be if the market were more
nearly perfect."21 They assert, however, that low pay for an occupation
in the public sector may reflect a political judgment which ought not
to be countered by pressures resulting from a strike. To say, however,
that the pay for an occupation would be higher if the employees had
the right to strike than if they did not is not independent proof that
strikes are inappropriate. The same criticism could be made of any
activity by a public employee group which affects its pay. An inde-
pendent rationale must be provided to explain why some means which
are effective in raising wages (strikes) are inappropriate while other
means which are also effective (lobbying) are appropriate. Whether the
Wellington and Winter discussion of the politically based decision-
making model for the public sector provides this rationale will be dis-
cussed in more detail subsequently.
B. Costs of Collective Bargaining
Wellington and Winter's discussion of the cost of substituting col-
lective for individual bargaining in the public sector includes a chain
18. Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1120.
19. Id. at 1113.
20. "Under purely competitive conditions, it is assumed that perfect knowledge of
existing wage rates in other firms, regions, and occupations, and mobility of both labor and
capital would tend to eradicate unnecessary wage differentials (i.e., differentials which did
not truly reflect the marginal productivity of labor). Both knowledge and mobility, how.
ever, are very imperfect in the real market. The existence of trade tniong to a large
extent compensates for the lack of knowledge and represents a force tending toward wage
standardization for similar work." A. CARTER AND F. MARSHALL, LAROR ECONOMICi.: JVAO19,
EMPLOYmENT, AND TRADn UNIONISMs 324-25 (1967).
21. Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1116.
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of causation which runs from (1) an allegation that market restraints
are weak in the public sector, largely because the services are essential;
to (2) an assertion that the public puts pressure on civic officials to
arrive at a quick settlement; to (8) a statement that other pressure
groups have no weapons comparable to a strike; to (4) a conclusion that
the strike thus imposes a high cost since the political process is distorted.
Let us discuss these steps in order:
(1) Market Restraints: A key argument in the case for the inappro-
priateness of public sector strikes is that economic constraints are not
present to any meaningful degree in the public sector.22 This argument
is not entirely convincing. First, wages lost due to strikes are as impor-
tant to public employees as they are to employees in the private sector.
Second, the public's concern over increasing tax rates may prevent the
decision-making process from being dominated by political instead of
economic considerations. The development of multilateral bargaining
in the public sector is an example of how the concern over taxes may
result in a close substitute for market constraints.2 In San Francisco,
for example, the Chamber of Commerce has participated in negotiations
between the city and public employee unions and has had some success
in limiting the economic gains of the unions. A third and related
economic constraint arises for such services as water, sewage and, in some
instances, sanitation, where explicit prices are charged. Even if repre-
sentatives of groups other than employees and the employer do not
enter the bargaining process, both union and local government are
aware of the economic implications of bargaining which leads to
higher prices which are clearly visible to the public. A fourth economic
constraint on employees exists in those services where subcontracting
to the private sector is a realistic alternative. 4 Warren, Michigan, re-
solved a bargaining impasse with an American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) local by subcontracting
its entire sanitation service; Santa Monica, California, ended a strike of
22. "It further seems to us that, to the extent union power is delimited by market or
other forces in the public sector, these constraints do not come into play nearly as quickly
as in the private." Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1117.
23. McLennan and Moskow, Multilateral Bargaining in the Public Sector, 21 IND. RE.
REs. ASSN. PROCEEDINGS 31 (1968).
24. The subcontracting option is realistic in functions sud as sanitation and street or
highway repairs, and some white collar occupations. Several other functions, including
hospitals and education, may be transferred entirely to the private sector. The ultimate
response by government is to terminate the service, at least temporarily. In late 1968,
Youngstown, Ohio, dosed its schools for five weeks due to a taxpayer's revolt. 281 Gov.
Emp. REL. REP. B-6 (1969). In late 1969, 10 Ohio school districts ran out of money and
were dosed down. Wall Street Journal, Dec. 19, 1969, at 1, col. I.
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city employees by threatening to subcontract its sanitation operations.
If the subcontracting option is preserved, wages in the public sector
need not exceed the rate at which subcontracting becomes a realistic
alternative.
An aspect of the lack-of-market-restraints argument is that public
services are essential. Even at the analytical level, Wellington and
Winter's case for essentiality is not convincing. They argue:
The Services performed by a private transit authority are neither
less nor more essential to the public than those that would be
performed if the transit atuhority were owned by a municipality.
A railroad or a dock strike may be much more damaging to a com-
munity than "job action" by teachers. This is not to say that
government services are not essential. They are both because they
may seriously injure a city's economy and occasionally the physical
welfare of its citizens. 25
This is a troublesome passage. It ends with the implicit conclusion
that all government services are essential. This conclusion is important
in Wellington and Winter's analysis because it is a step in their demon-
stration that strikes are inappropriate in all governmental services.
But the beginning of the passage, with its example of "job action" by
teachers, suggests that essentiality is not an inherent characteristic of
government services but depends on the specific service being evaluated.
Furthermore the transit authority example suggests that many services
are interchangeable between the public and private sectors. The view
that various government services are not of equal essentiality and
that there is considerable overlap between the kinds of services pro-
vided in the public and private sectors is reinforced by our field
work and strike data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Examples
include:
1. Where sanitation services are provided by a municipality, such as
Cleveland, sanitationmen are prohibited from striking. Yet, sanitation-
men in Philadelphia, Portland, and San Francisco are presumably
free to strike since they are employed by private contractors rather
than by the cities.
2. There were 25 local government strikes by the Teamsters in
1965-68, most involving truck drivers and all presumably illegAl. Yet
the Teamsters' strike involving fuel oil truck drivers in New York
25. Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1123.
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City last winter was legal even though the interruption of fuel oil
service was believed to have caused the death of several people.20
(2) Public Pressure: The second argument in the Wellington and
Winter analysis is that public pressure on city officials forces them to
make quick settlements. The validity of this argument depends on
whether the service is essential. Using as a criterion whether the service
is essential in the short run, we believe a priori that services can be
divided into three categories: (1) essential services-police and fire-
where strikes immediately endanger public health and safety; (2) inter-
mediate services-sanitation, hospitals, transit, water, and sewage-
where strikes of a few days might be tolerated; (3) nonessential services
-streets, parks, education, housing, welfare and general administration
-where strikes of indefinite duration could be tolerated.2 These
categories are not exact since essentiality depends on the size of the
city. Sanitation strikes will be critical in large cities such as New York
but will not cause much inconvenience in smaller cities where there
are meaningful alternatives to governmental operation of sanitation
services.
Statistics on the duration of strikes which occurred in the public
sector between 1965 and 1968 provide evidence not only that public
services are of unequal essentially, but also that the a priori categories
which we have used have some validity. As can be seen from Table 1,
strikes in the essential services (police and fire) had an average duration
of 4.7 days, while both the intermediate and the nonessential services
had an average duration of approximately 10.5 days. It is true that
the duration of strikes in the intermediate and nonessential services is
only half the average duration of strikes in the private sector during
these years.28 However, this comparison is somewhat misleading since
al of the public sector strikes were illegal, and many were ended by
injunction, while presumably a vast majority of the private sector
strikes did not suffer from these constraints. It would appear that with
the exception of police and fire protection, public officials are, to some
degree, able to accept long strikes. The ability of governments to
so choose indicates that political pressures generated by strikes are not
so strong as to undesirably distort the entire decision-making process
26. N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1968, at 1, col. 1, and Dec. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 5.
27. We consider education a nonessential service. However, because our portion of
the Brookings Institution study excludes education, our analysis in this article will also
largely exclude education.
28. U.S. BuRAu OF LABOR STATSTIcs, DFr'T or LABOR, BULL. No. 1611, AvALTSLS OF
WORK STOPPAGFS 1967, at 4 (1969).
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of government. City officials in Kalamazoo, Michigan, were able to
accept a forty-eight day strike by sanitationmen and laborers; Sacra-
mento County, California, survived an eighty-seven day strike by wel-
fare workers. A three month strike of hospital workers has occurred in
Cuyahoga County (Cleveland), Ohio.
(3) The Strike as a Unique Weapon: The third objection to the
strike is that it provides workers with a weapon unavailable to the
employing agency or to other pressure groups. Thus, unions have a
superior arsenal. The Taylor Committee Report opposes strikes for
this reason, among others, arguing that "there can scarcely be a coun-
tervailing lockout."29 Conceptually, we see no reason why lockouts
are less feasible in the public than in the private sector, Legally,
public sector lockouts are now forbidden, but so are strikes; presumably
both could be legalized. Actually, public sector lockouts have occurred.
The Social Service Employees Union (SSEU) of New York City spon-
sored a "work-in" in 1967 during which all of the caseworkers went
to their office but refused to work. Instead, union-sponsored lectures
were given by representatives of organizations such as CORE, and
symposia were held on the problems of welfare workers and clients.
The work-in lasted for one week, after which the City locked out
the caseworkers,
A similar assertion is made by Wellington and Winter, who claim
that no pressure group other than unions has a weapon comparable
to the strike. But this argument raises a number of questions. Is
the distinctive characteristic of an inappropriate method of influencing
decisions by public officials that it is economic as opposed to political?
If this is so, then presumably the threat of the New York Stock
Exchange to move to New Jersey unless New York City taxes on stock
transfers were lowered and similar devices should be outlawed along
with the strike.
(4) Distortion of the Political Process: The ultimate concern of both
the Taylor Committee and Wellington and Winter is that "a strike
of government employees ...introduces an alien force in the legis.
lative process."30 It is "alien" because, in the words of the Taylor
Committee Report:
Careful thought about the matter shows conclusively, we believe,
that while the right to strike normally performs a useful function
in the private enterprise sector (where relative economic power
29. TAYLOR CO I ,rrmTE R.E ORT, supra note 1, at 15.
30. Id.
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is the final determinant in the making of private agreements),
it is not compatible with the orderly functioning of our democratic
form of representative government (in which relative political
power is the final determinant).31
The essence of this analysis appears to be that certain means used to
influence the decision-making process in the public sector-those which
are political-are legitimate, while other-those which are economic-
are not. For several reasons, we believe that such distinctions among
means are tenuous.
First, any scheme which differentiates economic power from political
power faces a perplexing definitional task. The International Encyclo-
pedia of the Social Sciences defines the political process as "the activ-
ities of people in various groups as they struggle for-and use-power
to achieve personal and group purposes."32 And what is power?
Power in use invariably involves a mixture of many different
forms-sometimes mutually reinforcing-of persuasion and pres-
sure . . ..
Persuasion takes place when A influences B to adopt a course
of action without A's promising or threatening any reward or
punishment. It may take the form of example, expectation, pro-
posals, information, education, or propaganda ....
Pressure is applied by A upon B whenever A tries to make
a course of action more desirable by promising or threatening
contingent rewards or punishments. It may take the form of force,
commands, manipulation, or bargaining ....
Physical force is a blunt instrument .... Besides, more flexible
and reliable modes of pressure are available. Rewards, in the form
of monetary payments, new positions, higher status, support, favor-
able votes, cooperation, approval, or the withdrawal of any antic-
ipated punishment, may be bestowed or promised. Punishment,
in the form of fines, firing, reduction in status, unfavorable votes,
noncooperation, rejection, disapproval, or withdrawal of any antic-
ipated reward, may be given or threatened ....
Bargaining is a still more fluid-and far more persuasive-
form of using pressure. In bargaining, all sides exercise power upon
each other through reciprocal promises or threats .... Indeed,
force, command, and manipulation tend to become enveloped in
the broader and more subtle processes of bargaining.-
We have quoted at length from this discussion of the political process
because we believe it illustrates the futility of attempting to distinguish
31. Id. at 18-19.
32. 12 INT'L ENCYC. SOCIAL ScENcEs 265 (1968).
33. Id. at 269-70.
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between economic and political power. The former concept would seem
to be encompassed by the latter. The degree of overlap is problematical
since there can be economic aspects to many forms of persuasion and
pressure. It may be possible to provide an operational distinction
between economic power and political power, but we do not believe
that those who would rely on this distinction have fulfilled their task.,l
Second, even assuming it is possible to operationally distinguish
economic power and political power, a rationale for utilizing the dis.
tinction must be provided. Such a rationale would have to distinguish
between the categories either on the basis of characteristics inherent
in them as a means of action or on the basis of the ends to which the
means are directed. Surely an analysis of ends does not provide a mean-
ingful distinction. The objectives of groups using economic pressure
are of the same character as those of groups using political pressure-
both seek to influence executive and legislative determinations such as
the allocation of funds and the tax rate. If it is impossible effectively
to distinguish economic from political pressure groups in terms of their
ends, and it is desirable to free the political process from the influence
of all pressure groups, then effective lobbying and petitioning should be
as illegal as strikes.
If the normative distinction between economic and political power
is based, not on the ends desired, but on the nature of the means,
our skepticism remains undiminished. Are all forms of political pres-
sure legitimate? Then consider the range of political activity observed
in the public sector. Is lobbying by public sector unions to be ap-
proved? Presumably it is. What then of participation in partisan
political activity? On city time? Should we question the use of cam-
paign contributions or kickbacks from public employees to public
officials as a means of influencing public sector decisions? These ques-
tions suggest that political pressures, as opposed to economic pres-
sures, cannot as a class be considered more desirable.
Our antagonism toward a distinction based on means does not rest
solely on a condemnation of political pressures which violate statutory
provisions. We believe that perfectly legal forms of political pressure
34. It is interesting to note that some who would differentiate between economic and
political considerations apparently view public sector strikes as political activity. Stleber,
Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in CHALLENGES TO CoLLECrivt BARGAININC 83(L. Ulman ed. 1967): "The basic question is whether the strike, which in the United
States has been viewed primarily as an economic weapon, is equally appropriate when used
as a political weapon." If Stieber's characterization of public sector strikes is correct, theh
presumably the rationale of the Taylor Committee Report should make these strikes
legal.
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have no automatic superiority over economic pressure. In this regard,
the evidence from our field work is particularly enlightening. First,
we have found that the availability of political power varies among
groups of employees within a given city. Most public administrators
have respect for groups which can deliver votes at strategic times.
Because of their links to private sector unions, craft unions are in-
variably in a better position to play this political role than a union
confined to the public sector, such as AFSCME. In Chicago, Cleve-
land and San Francisco, the public sector craft unions are closely
allied with the building trades council and play a key role in labor
relations with the city. Prior to the passage of state collective bargaining
laws such unions also played the key role in Detroit and New York City.
In the No-Strike Model, craft unions dearly have the comparative
advantage because of their superior political power.
Second, the range of issues pursued by unions relying on political
power tends to be narrow. The unions which prosper by eschewing
economic power and exercising political power are often found in cities,
such as Chicago, with a flourishing patronage system. These unions
gain much of their political power by cooperating with the political
administration. This source of political power would vanish if the
unions were assiduously to pursue a goal of providing job security for
their members since this goal would undermine the patronage system.
In Rochester, for example, a union made no effort to protect one of
its members who was fired for political reasons. For the union to have
opposed the city administration at that time on an issue of job security
would substantially have reduced the union's influence on other issues.
In Chicago, where public sector strikes are rare (except for education)
but political considerations are not, the unions have made little effort
to establish a grievance procedure to protect their members from arbi-
trary treatment.
Third, a labor relations system built on political power tends to be
unstable since some groups of employees, often a substantial number,
are invariably left out of the system. They receive no representation
either through patronage or through the union. In Memphis, the craft
unions had for many years enjoyed a "working relationship" with the
city which assured the payment of the rates that prevailed in the
private sector and some control over jobs. The sanitation laborers, how-
ever, were not part of the system and were able to obtain effective re-
presentation only after a violent confrontation with the city in 1968.
Having been denied representation through the political process, they
had no choice but to accept a subordinate position in the city or to
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initiate a strike to change the system. Racial barriers were an Important
factor in the isolation of the Memphis sanitation laborers. Similar
distinctions in racial balance among functions and occupations appear
in most of the cities we visited.
C. Conclusions in Regard to Strikes and the Political Process
Wellington and Winter and the Taylor Committee reject the use
of the Strike Model in the public sector. They have endorsed the
No-Strike Model in order "to ensure the survival of the 'normal'
American political process."3r5 Our field work suggests that unions which
have actually helped their members either have made the strike threat
a viable weapon despite its illegality or have intertwined themselves
closely with their nominal employer through patronage-political support
arrangements. If this assessment is correct, choice of the No-Strike
Model is likely to lead to patterns of decision making which will
subvert, if not the "normal" American political process, at least the
political process which the Taylor Committee and Wellington and
Winter meant to embrace. We would not argue that the misuse of
political power will be eliminated by legalizing the strike; on balance,
however, we believe that, in regard to most governmental functions,
the Strike Model has more virtues than the No-Strike Model. Whether
strikes are an appropriate weapon for all groups of public employees
is our next topic.
IV. Differentation Among Public Sector Functions
The most important union for local government employees, The
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees
(AFSCME), issued a policy statement in 1966 claiming the right of
public employees to strike:
AFSCME insists upon the right of public employees,. to strike,
To forestall this right is to handicap free collective bargaining
process [sic]. Wherever legal barriers to the exercise of this right
exist, it shall be our policy to seek the removal of such barriers,
Where one party at the bargaining table possesses all the power
and authority, the bargaining becomes no more than formalized
petitioning. 6
35, Wellington and Winter, supra note 2, at 1125-26.
36. INTERNATIONAL EXEcuTIvE BOARD AFSCME, POLICY STATEMENT ON PUBLIC EMPLOY=
UNIONS: AIGHTS AND RE SPoNsmILrI 2 (July 26, 1966).
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Significantly, AFSGME specifically excluded police and other law en-
forcement officers from this right. Any local of police officers that
engages in a strike or other concerted refusal to perform duties will
have its charter revoked.
Can a distinction among functions, such as is envisioned by AFSCME,
be justified? In view of the high costs associated with the suppression
of strikes, could each stoppage be dealt with, as Theodore Kheel sug-
gests, only when and if it becomes an emergency?
Despite arguments to the contrary, we feel that strikes in some es-
sential services, such as fire and police, would immediately endanger
the public health and safety and should be presumed illegal. We have
no evidence from our field work to support our fears that any dis-
ruption of essential services will quickly result in an emergency. But
the events which occurred on September 9, 1919, during a strike by
Boston policemen provide strong proof; those which occurred on
October 7, 1969, following a strike by Montreal policemen would ap-
pear to make the argument conclusive. Contemporary accounts amply
describe the holocausts:
Boston, 1919
About me milled a crowd of aimless men and women, just
seeing what they could see .... There was an air of expectancy
without knowing what was expected.
Then came the sound of two hard substances in sharp impact,
followed a second later by a louder one and the thrilling crash
of falling splintering glass. A plate show-window had been shattered.
Instantly the window and its immediate vicinity were filled with
struggling men, a mass of action, from which emerged from time
to time bearers of shirts, neckties, collars, hats. In a few seconds
the window was bare. Some with loot vanished; others lingered.
Lootless ones were attacking the next window. Nothing hap-
pened. That is, the fear of arrest abated after the first shock of
the lawless acts. I saw men exchanging new shirts each with the
other, to get their sizes . . . good-looking men, mature in years,
bearing all the earmarks of a lifetime of sane observance of property
rights. 7
Montreal, 1969
"You've never seen the city like this," said the owner of a big
women's clothing store surveying his premises, strewn with dum-
37. C. WOOD, REDS AND LOST WVAGES 9-10 (1930), as quoted in D. ZtsruD, ONE TloUtiAlD
SnUIKFS OF GOVENMENT EmmIoymas 45 (1940).
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mies from which the clothing had been torn. "It's like the war."38
A taxi driver carrying a passenger up Sherbrooke Street in Mon-
treal today blamed the police for "not knowing the effect their
absence would have on people." He continued: "I don't mean
hoodlums and habitual lawbreakers, I mean just plain people
committed offenses they would not dream of trying if there was
a policeman standing on the corner. I saw cars driven through
red lights. Drivers shot up the wrong side of the street because
they realized no one would catch them." 39
In the case of strikes by essential employees, such as policemen,
the deterioration of public order occurs almost immediately. During
the first few hours of the police walkout in Montreal, robberies oc-
curred at eight banks, one finance company, two groceries, a jewelry
store and a private bank.40 In the case of the Boston police strike of
1919, outbreaks began within four hours after the strike had com-
menced. Such consequences require that strikes by police and other
essential services be outlawed in advance. There is simply no time to
seek an injunction.
Even if a distinction in the right to strike can be made among
government functions on the basis of essentiality, is such a distinction
possible to implement? The Taylor Committee based their argument
against prohibiting strikes in essential functions but allowing them
elsewhere on this difficulty:
We come to this conclusion [to prohibit all strikes] after a full
consideration of the views . . . that public employees in non-
essential government services, at least, should have the same right
to strike as has been accorded to employees in private industry.
We realize, moreover, that the work performed in both sectors
is sometimes comparable or identical. Why, then, should an in-
terruption of non-essential governmental services be prohibited?
To begin with, a differentation between essential and non-
essential governmental services would be the subject of such in-
tense and never ending contoversy as to be administratively im-
possible. 41
Despite the conclusion of the Taylor Committee it appears that in prac-
tice a distinction is emerging between strikes in essential services and
strikes in other services. Employee organizations and public officials do
38. N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
59. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1969, at 2, col. 6.
40. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1969, at 3, col. 1.
41. TAYLOR Cols.EE REPORT, supra note 1, at 18.
434
Vol. 79: 418, 1970
The Role and Consequences of Strikes
in fact treat some strikes as critical, while other strikes cause no undue
concern.
Our analysis of the Bureau of Labor Statistics strike data pertaining
to the last four years suggests that it is possible to devise an operational
definition of essential service. First, as we have indicated above, strike
duration was considerably shorter in the essential services than in the
intermediate or nonessential services [see Table 1]. These data suggest
TABLE 1"
DfuAnoN oF STRmEs BY Ess axrry oF FuNCION





* Based on data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on strikes during 1965.63
involving employees of local government.
** Standard deviation is a measure of dispersion around the average or the mean.
that, except in police and ire services, public officials have some discre-
tion in choosing to accept long strikes. Second, the statistics reveal that
managers have been able to distinguish between essential and non-
essential services in their use of counter sanctions. In strikes involving
essential services, injunctions were sought more frequently and em-
ployees, because of their short run indispensability, were fired less fre-
quently. Injunctions were granted in 35% of the essential strikes, and
in 25% of the intermediate, but only in 19% of the nonessential
strikes. Third, partial operation was attempted more frequently in
essential services [see Table 2]. By using nonstrikers, supervisors, re-
placements or volunteers, local governments were able to continue
partial operation during 92% of the essential strikes, but in only 80%
of the intermediate, and 77% of the nonessential strikes. Such data
suggest that it may be administratively feasible to differentiate among
public services so as to permit some, but not all, public employees to
strike. Indeed, public administrators already seem to be making such
distinctions.
The idea that distinctions among functions are appropriate is also
beginning to emerge among legislators. The first state to move in this
direction has been Vermont, which apparently restricts municipal em-
ployee strikes only if they endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the
public.2 Unfortunately-at least from the viewpoint of researchers-
42. Vn. STAT. ANx. tit 21, § 1704 (Supp. 1969).
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there has been no experience under the statute. Montana prohibits
strikes in private or public hospitals only if there is another strike in
effect in a hospital within a radius of 150 miles.4 3 Study commissions in
other states have accepted the distinction between essential and non-
essential services. In 1968, the Governor's Commission in Pennsylvania
recommended a limited right to strike for all public employees except
police and firemen.4 In 1969, the Labor Law Committee of the Ohio
State Bar Association recommended repeal of the Ferguson Act, which
prohibits strikes by public employees.40 They proposed a Public Em-
ployment Relations Act which would permit strikes by recognized
employee organizations in nonessential occupations following man-
datory use of fact-finding procedures."0 The proposed statute states:
1ifn the event a public employer and a certified labor organization
are unable to reach an agreement within forty-five days following
the date of the receipt of the recommendation of the fact-finding
board, the public employees in the bargaining unit.., and/or
the labor organization shall not thereafter be prohibited from
engaging in any strike until such time as the labor organization
and the public employer reach agreement on a collective bargain-
ing agreement.47
V. Implications for Public Policy
We have expressed our views on the market restraints that exist
in the public sector, the extent of the public pressure on public officials
to reach quick settlements, the likely methods by which decisions
would be made in the No-Strike Model, and the desirability and fea-
sibility of differentiating among government services on the basis of
essentiality. In this light, what public policy seems appropriate for
strikes at the local government level?
In general, we believe that strikes in the public sector should be
legalized for the same reasons they are legal in the private sector. For
some public sector services, however-namely, police and fire protec-
tion-the probability that a strike will result in immediate danger to
public health and safety is so substantial that strikes are almost invari-
ably inappropriate. In these essential functions, the strike should be
43. REV. CODES 0o1 MoNTANA tit. 41, § 2209 (Supp, 1969).
44. THE GovERNOR's COrMISSION TO RmISE TE P UBLIc EmpLoYEE LAWS Or PEVNslm-
VANiA, REPORT AND REcoMMENDATIONS, in 251 Gov. Emr. Rn.. RnP. E-1 (1965).
45. OHIO REV. CODE §§ 4117.01-4117.05 (1964).
46. 42 OHIo BAR 563 (1969).
47. Id. at 576.
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presumed illegal; the state should not be burdened with the require-
ment of seeking an injunction. We would, however, permit employees
in a service considered essential to strike if they could demonstrate to a
court that a disruption of service would not endanger the public. Like-
wise, we would permit the government to obtain an injunction against
a strike in a service presumed nonessential if a nontrivial danger to the
public could be shown.48
The decision to permit some, but not all, public employee strikes
cannot, of course, take place in vaccus publicum jus. Mediation, fact
finding, or advisory arbitration may be appropriate for those functions
where strikes are permitted. Where strikes are illegal because of the
essential nature of the service, it may be necessary to institute compul-
sory arbitration.49 The choice of a proper role for third parties in
the public sector is difficult, and we do not wish to leave the impression
that we are unaware of the problem. In our portion of the Brookings
Institution study, we will examine the experience which many cities
have had in the use of neutral third parties. Our initial reaction is that
such experience does not undermine the feasibility of a public policy
which would permit some, but not all, public employees the right to
strike, and include that decision in a comprehensive public policy for
collective bargaining.
While we have indicated our support for the right of public employ-
ees to strike, we do not mean to suggest that all strikes are desirable.
In particular, strikes which are necessary solely because the employer
refuses to establish a bargaining relationship seem anachronous. The
right of employees to deal with their employer through a representative
of their choosing should be reflected in our public policy. The obliga-
tion on employers to recognize and to bargain with properly certified
unions has eliminated many strikes in the private sector. The evidence
in Table 3 suggests that, in the public sector, strikes on such issues can
48. The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) is a statute which pre-
sumes strikes are legal unless an emergency is involved. 29 U.S.C. §§ 176-180 (1969). The
President may delay or suspend an actual or threatened strike which if permitted to occur
or continue will constitute a threat to the national health or safety. The emergency
procedures have been invoked 29 times since 1947. This experience should provide some
guidance in formulating an operational version of our policy which would permit strikes
in nonessential functions unless a nontrivial danger to the public could be shown. We
realize that it may be more difficult to formulate an operational version of our policy for
essential functions. We are not aware of any experience with a statute which permits the
presumption of illegality for strikes to be rebutted under appropriate circumstances.
49. Michigan has recently enacted a statute applicable to public police and fire depart-
ments which imposes penalties on striking employees and establishes a binding arbitration
procedure for negotiating disputes. Arbitration is available upon the request of either
party in the dispute. MIcH. Comr. LAws §§ 423.232-.247 (1948).
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TABLE 3
LocAL GoaRNwNm'T STRImS ny PuBLic Poucy A'D Issu e
Noneducation Strikes Education Strikes
Duration Number Duration
Number in Days in Days
Mandatory Law
Strikes to establish
bargaining relationship** 1 10.0 5 3.4
Other strikes 56 6.7 104 8.7
Permissive Law
Strikes to establish
bargaining relationship 20 19.6 2 7.0
Other strikes 34 10A 16 6.5
No Law
Strikes to establish
bargaining relationship 68 21.6 29 5.9
Other strikes 150 5.8 93 6.2
1 Based on data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics on strikes during 1965.6S
involving employees of local governments.
** Includes strikes where union was demanding recognition as well as strikes 'here
union was demanding bona fide collective bargaining.
be sharply reduced. In those states in which local governments are re-
quired to recognize and to bargain with unions representing a majority
of their employees, strikes to establish the bargaining relationship have
been virtually eliminated. States with permissive laws, which require
minimal recognition of unions and which require only that employers
"meet and confer," as opposed to "bargain," with these unions, have
perhaps aggravated the strike problem.
Similarly, our general endorsement of public sector strikes does not
mean that we are unconcerned about the circumstances under which
such strikes take place. Public policy has an important role to play in
shaping the structure and, hence, influencing the outcome of collective
bargaining.O An example is the inclusion or exclusion of supervisors
in the bargaining unit. As indicated in Table 2, supervisors are often
used during strikes to provide partial operation. Presumably, this en-
hances the ability of local governments to resist union demands. Some
states, such as Wisconsin,51 have wisely stipulated that supervisors are
to be excluded from bargaining units, while other states, such as New
York, have not. A supervisor who belongs to a striking union is likely
50. For a discussion of collective bargaining structure, see Weber, Stability and Change
in the Structure of Collective Bargaining, in CMI..NGFS TO CoLLEc'nvz B..cZANcNo 13
(L. Ulman ed. 1967).
51. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.81(12) (Supp. 1969), relates to state employees.
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to be of limited usefulness to management in attempting to counteract
the strike. Another way in which a state's public policy could enhance
local government's ability to resist strikes would be to enact a statute
prohibiting public employers from signing away their right to subcon-
tract. The absolute right to subcontract operations would thereby be
preserved. While it is unlikely that some services, such as police and fire
protection, will ever be placed under private management, other ser-
vices can be subcontracted if union demands raise the cost of a public
service to a level at which private service becomes competitive. Exclud-
ing the education sector, subcontracting was threatened by manage-
ment in 16 local government strikes and implemented in five between
1965 and 1968.
VI. Conclusions
This article has offered a policy to deal with public sector strikes. It
has also examined several propositions concerning public sector strikes
which have been based largely on logical analysis. The assertions that
strikes by public employees inevitably distort the decision-making pro-
cess in the public sector and that differential treatment of public em-
ployees in their right to strike would be infeasible have been found to
be wanting when evaluated in the light of our actual experience with
public sector strikes. This evaluation suggests that logic alone is an in-
adequate basis for public policy in this area. Yet we would not want to
suggest that a literal interpretation of Holmes' view on the relative
merits of logic and experience is appropriate. If we were forced to
choose a mentor in any debate concerning the proper bases for law, we
endorse Gardozo:
My analysis of the judicial process comes then to this, and little
more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility, and the accepted
standards of right conduct, are the forces which singly or in com-
bination shape the progress of the law.
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